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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5292
Alleviating poverty for the elderly requires a different 
approach from other age groups, and a minimum 
pension is likely to be the only viable option. This paper 
examines the impact on old age poverty and the fiscal 
cost of universal minimum old age pensions in 18 Latin 
American countries using recent household survey data. 
First the authors measure old age poverty rates for these 
countries. Then they discuss the design of minimum 
pensions schemes—means-tested or not—as well as the 
disincentives they introduce for the economic and social 
behavior of households including labor supply, saving 
and family solidarity. Finally, the authors use household 
survey data to simulate the fiscal cost and the impact on 
This paper—a product of the  Chief Economist’s Office, Development Economics Department—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to  help inform development assistance and policy choices aiming to reduce poverty. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at jdethier@
worldbank.org.  
poverty rates of alternative minimum pension schemes in 
the 18 countries. They show that a universal minimum 
pension would substantially reduce poverty among the 
elderly (except in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay 
where minimum pension systems already exist and 
poverty rates are low). Such schemes have much to be 
commended in terms of incentives, spillover effects and 
administrative simplicity, but they have a high fiscal 
cost. The latter is a function of the age at which benefits 
are awarded, the prevailing longevity, the generosity 
of benefits, the efficacy of means testing, and the fiscal 
capacity of the country. Universal Minimum Old Age Pensions:  
Impact on Poverty and Fiscal Cost in 18 Latin American Countries 
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Alleviating poverty in old age requires a different approach from other age 
groups. Since policies that go through labor and output markets and educational and 
training programs are ineffective, the only available instrument to alleviate old age 
poverty is a transfer of real income (possibly through price subsidies). In most developed 
countries, pension systems—which generally consist of a balanced combination of pay-
as-you-go and funded schemes—include minimum pension schemes and are strongly 
redistributive, yielding a sizeable difference between poverty rates before and after 
transfer.
2  By contrast, in developing countries with pension systems, one observes that 
they have a limited potential to solve old-age poverty because of the low coverage of 
those systems.  Coverage rates are below 30% in half Latin American countries (see 
Appendix Table A1).. They range from around 10 % of the labor force in Peru and 
Bolivia to about 60 % in Chile. These figures are for 2006 and are based on the number 
of contributors (Mesa-Lago 2004, Rofman et al. 2008). As to the coverage of the elderly, 
the rates are extremely low in most Latin American countries. They range from 5% in 
Honduras to 85% in Uruguay. They are about or higher than 60 % in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay plus Costa Rica and Bolivia. 
                                                 
2 Public old age pension systems are generally considered to have two objectives: income replacement and 
poverty prevention. Contributory schemes (also called earnings-related or insurance-based schemes) are 
used for the first objective. To fulfill the second objective, one relies on noncontributory schemes providing 
minimum rate benefits (also called social pension). Both separation and combination of these objectives 
have merits. By separating the two functions, one hopes that the only distortions will arise from the 
redistributive pillar and that the contributory pillar will carry no deadweight loss. By combining them, it is 
hoped that workers will perceive the contributions they have to pay as an insurance premium and not as a 
tax. How payroll taxes are perceived is an open and unresolved question (See on this point, Schokkaert et 
al. 2003 and Gill et al. 2005). Another advantage of merging the two functions is to make the whole system 
more politically sustainable. This view prevails in Continental European countries which follow the 
Bismarckian tradition (Casamatta et al. 2001). Empirically and theoretically, there appears to be a positive 
relationship between the generosity of a pension system and its contributory nature. 3 
 
A more efficient solution consists of lump-sum transfers financed by tax receipts. 
These are pensions aimed at providing a replacement income to old persons under the 
poverty line and are of two types (Willmore 2001; Holzmann et al. 2009).
3  The first type 
of minimum pension covers unconditionally all the elderly. Benefits are the same for 
everyone regardless of income, assets or work history. This distinguishes it from means-
tested pensions which do not provide benefits (or provide reduced benefits) to those who 
have other income or assets, and from the minimum pension guarantee for which 
beneficiaries must have a history of contributions. In the OECD, only one country (New 
Zealand) provides a universal pension to its aged population with the objective to lift old 
persons above the poverty line. In low and middle income countries, only four countries 
have such universal minimum pension arrangements: Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana and 
Bolivia.
4 They are easy to administer and do not require information on the income of 
assets of the beneficiaries. They offer a pension which is relatively low and, with the 
exception of Mauritius, not high enough to lift its beneficiaries above the poverty line.  
The second type of minimum pension is also universal but subject to means-testing. This 
welfare pension can be completed by housing subsidy or the possibility of being admitted 
in a public nursing home.
5  A number of developing countries have universal means-
tested schemes although the means test applies to the household and not to the individual. 
The most famous examples are Brazil and South Africa.  The South African minimum 
pension is quite generous in terms of level (about one-third of per capita income) and the 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that reduced contributory pensions are also called “minimum pension schemes.”  These 
are aimed at workers who have had some work career but could not accumulate enough pension rights to 
reach a certain minimum level. These workers are entitled to a minimum pension that is not subject to any 
condition, except age condition and sometimes family structure.  
 
4 On Mauritius, see Willmore 2003. 
 
5  There is also an age condition and, in some cases, conditions of citizenship or legal residency. 4 
 
number of beneficiaries is high reaching 88% of the covered population.  The pension is 
paid to men aged 65 and women aged 60 and over. It is funded through general taxation. 
The Brazilian minimum pension, for which the eligibility age is 60 for men and 55 for 
women, corresponds to the minimum wage (Carvalho Filho 2008, Iwakami et al. 2004). 
It is also worth mentioning Mexico City (Federal District) and its program of transfers for 
food expenses to the elderly living in  poor areas. A few studies examine the incidence of 
minimum pension schemes. Barrientos (2003a) studies the effect of social pensions on 
the poverty rate of elderly people in rural Brazil and South Africa and computes poverty 
rates and poverty gaps with and without means-tested minimum pension. He shows that. 
in both countries. the non-contributory pension reduces both the rate of poverty and the 
poverty gap. Rivera-Marques, Morris, Wodon and Siaens (2004) study the incidence of 
Mexico City’s safety net for the elderly and show that the program reduces poverty and 
inequality but that its performance in terms of poverty reduction is weaker as soon as the 
eligibility rules are relaxed (no means test and extension to non-poor areas). Other recent 
analyses of universal means-tested pension schemes—which are discussed below—
include Carvalho Filho 2008; Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller 2003; and Duflo 2003. 
In Latin America, five countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay—
have non-contributory pensions (Bertranou, Solorio and van Ginneken 2002 and 2004). 
These programs generally have a social assistance character in that they are targeted at 
the poor and disabled who have no contributory capacity. In Brazil and Costa Rica, part 
of the social assistance pension benefits is financed by cross-subsidies from social 
insurance programs. In terms of coverage, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica offer the 
greatest coverage but, in absolute terms, Brazil has a social assistance program with more 5 
 
than 2 million beneficiaries and, if the rural pensions program is included, the number of 
beneficiaries exceeds 8 million.
6 Even with high rate of coverage poverty will only be 
eradicated if benefits are high enough and the family structure is not too burdensome. See 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   Pension Policies in Latin American Countries 

















Argentina  mixed  1994  40.9  44.6  70.5 
Bolivia  private 1997  12.5  13.1  89.8 
Brazil  public  -  48.1  51.7  85.3 
Chile  private 1981  62.7  67.3  75.5 
Colombia  pub/priv  1994  31.8  32.3  25.1 
CostaRica  mixed 2001  62.7  65.1  59.2 
Dom Rep  private  2003  20.2  23.7  11.9 
Ecuador  mixed 2004  26.2  26.6  31.0 
Guatemala  public  -  26.8  27.2  15.4 
Honduras  public -  20.1  20.7  5.3 
Mexico  private  1997  35.9  36.0  23.3 
Nicaragua  private 2004  18.5  19.3  44.9 
Panama  public  -  45.1  54.4  41.7 
Peru  pub/priv 1993  14.0  14.6  27.7 
Paraguay  public  -  12.8  13.5  14.9 
Salvador  private 1998  29.1  31.2  16.2 
Uruguay  mixed  1996  61.1  67.3  85.6 
Venezuela  public -  35.3  37.8 31.3 




Evidence on Poverty in Old Age   
At the international level, surprisingly little evidence is available on poverty in 
old age.  World Bank statistical compilations, for example, do not report poverty rates for 
                                                 
6  We are grateful to Rafael Rofman for sharing with us his data on coverage. 6 
 
all age groups (World Bank 2005). Data on child poverty are published separately but not 
data on poverty in old age. Only recently have there been efforts to publish 
internationally comparable indicators of welfare from an age-specific perspective for rich 
and poor countries (HelpAge International 2004; Kakwani and Subbarao 2005).  
In developed countries, the old age poverty rates are generally not much lower 
than those for the total population but this is a relatively recent trend.  A few decades ago, 
the average income of the elderly was substantially lower than that of other age groups 
and their rate of poverty much higher (Förster, Fuchs and Makovec 2003).  In developing 
countries, patterns are different and there is no obvious trend. As far as Latin America is 
concerned, the poverty headcount for the elderly is clearly lower than for the population 
average in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay and to a lesser extent in 
Nicaragua and Panama. It is higher in the other  countries as shown in figure 1 below.  
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay—which are among the richest countries in our 
sample—will often behave differently from the rest. 
Poverty in old age can still be observed even in countries—for instance in the 
OECD—that have generous transfers for the elderly including targeted minimum 
pensions.  This seems puzzling at first sight since the pension is universal and its level is 
above the poverty line (generally half the median income). There are at least three 
reasons for this apparent puzzle: family composition (if the other family members do not 
have any resource. the equivalent income of each member can be below the poverty line); 
take-up issue (when the pension is means-tested some individuals can be reluctant to 
claim it) and finally, given that it is subject to a means-test, some elderly people prefer to 
keep their assets even if these assets do not generate much income (Pestieau 2006). 7 
 
Data Used in this Study 
This study uses microdata from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) which  is based on household surveys conducted across 25 
Latin American countries
7. All household surveys are nationally representative with the 
exception of Argentina, where surveys cover the urban population only.
8 SEDLAC 
harmonizes survey data across countries and produces for each country comparable 
measures of individual and household income, demographic characteristics, education, 
employment, housing, infrastructure, and durable goods and services.
9 
Individual income in SEDLAC is the sum of income from all sources received by 
an individual. Where possible, labor income (defined as income from the individual’s 
main occupation) is distinguished from non-labor income, which is divided into three 
categories: (i) pensions, (ii) capital and benefits and (iii) transfers. Household income is 
the sum of the total individual income across all household members.
10 
Although consumption is generally the preferred measure of well-being, this 
study follows other literature focused on the region and uses income instead as this is the 
only measure of well-being available in most Latin American household surveys. Very 
                                                 
7 SEDLAC countries include Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela RB. 
 
8 This is of limited concern for this study given that the urban population in Argentina represents more than 
85% of the total population in the country. 
 
9 For a complete description of survey instruments underlying the harmonized SEDLAC data and related 
methodological issues, see http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/. 
 
10 An additional issue arises due to spatial variation in prices and its implications for distributional studies 
(Deaton, 1997; Ravallion and Chen, 1997). This variation poses a challenge for SEDLAC data (and for the 
household surveys it is based on) since most LAC countries do not routinely collect information on local 
prices as part of household surveys, making it difficult to perform price adjustments. In order to correct for 
this, rural incomes in SEDLAC are increased by a factor of 15% to capture differences in rural-urban 
prices. This value is an average based on available studies of prices in the region and is certainly arbitrary, 
but arguably represents an improvement on unadjusted prices. 8 
 
few countries in the region conduct national household surveys with 
consumption/expenditure-based questionnaires, and where they exist, they are conducted 
infrequently. It is expected that SEDLAC will incorporate consumption data in the future 
as LAC countries start collecting information on household spending more frequently. 
SEDLAC’s US$ 2-a-day poverty line in local currency units for each country is 
computed using the 2005 international poverty line adjusted by PPP and the national 
price index of the country for the month in which the respective country survey was 
conducted. 
 
Old Age Poverty Rates under Current Policies 
Figure 1a presents the poverty ratio for the persons older than 60 and for the whole 
population in Latin America. The poverty ratio is based on a poverty line equal to half the 
median income of the household. Figure 1b present the poverty ratio using a different 
definition of the poverty line, namely a poverty line equal to $2.5 a day. The equivalence 
scale we use is the OECD scale that is equal to 0.5 + 0.5 x number of adults + 0.3 x 
number of children (up to age 16).
11 
With the poverty rate calculated with the OECD scale and a poverty line equal to half the 
median income, Brazil, Chili, Uruguay, Argentina (and to a lesser extent Nicaragua) have 
low poverty rates comparable to most OECD countries (below 11%).
12 These four 
                                                 
11 Poverty rates for the population aged 65+ (instead of 60+) and for per capita income (instead of 
equivalized income) are presented in the Appendix. 
 
12 These figures for Latin America can be compared with the figures for Africa where the percentage of 
households with elderly living alone is small. Elderly with children are also a small percentage (about 1% 
in Uganda, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi).  However, households headed by the elderly are 
more frequent, ranging between 12 to 27 percent.  The incidence of poverty among elderly persons is 
generally higher than on average, and higher than among the non-elderly in 11 of the 15 countries for 9 
 
countries are often associated as having the same “mature” treatment of old age. It is 
worth noting that they do not all belong to the richest Latin American countries as one 
can see on Table A1. Mexico and Venezuela are richer than Brazil and Argentina. For the 
other 14 countries the poverty rates are quite higher and in most cases higher than for the 
rest of the population. With the US$2.5 a day poverty threshold the poverty rates in 
ABCU become negligible (<3%), still lower in old age than in the whole population. In 
Nicaragua as well the poverty rate of the elderly is lower than that of the rest of the 
population, but both are high.. 
We draw three main conclusions from the comparison of old age poverty rates in 
these Latin American countries. First, poverty rates are consistently lower for the elderly 
than for the whole population in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile.
13 Second, in the 
other countries, the situation is heterogeneous and depends on the poverty line chosen. 
Using half the median income, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras and Mexico 
have comparable overall levels of poverty in old age and the elderly are poorer than the 
rest of the population. Finally, the difference between old age and overall poverty rates is 
not very high for all countries with limited pension systems.  
When household per capita income (or expenditure) is used as the main welfare 
indicator, the assumption made about the way in which resources are shared in the family 
to which an elderly belongs affects the quality of the estimates, as pointed out by Deaton 
and Paxson (1998). The assumptions made by statistical agencies can by themselves bias 
                                                                                                                                                 
which data are available. The exceptions are Burundi, Madagascar, Mozambique and Uganda (Kakwani 
and Subbarao 2005). 
 
13 Interestingly, this is not the case in Costa Rica which has a non-contributory pension scheme but with the 
least generous average benefit of the 5 Latin countries with social assistance pensions (Bertranou, Solorio 
and van Ginneken 2004). 
 10 
 
estimates against old age poverty.  As an example Deaton (1997, p. 243) cites that the 
“fact” that there is less poverty among the elderly in the United States depends on the 
assumption in the official counts that the elderly need less than adults younger than 60.  
Two major issues complicate the problem of obtaining poverty rates for old age. 
First, the elderly may often be living in households that are not that poor even though 
they themselves are not receiving any pension so that the often used implicit assumption 
of fair sharing might be invalid.
14  Second, the measurement of poverty in old age needs 
to be sensitive to the potential impact of economies of scale in household consumption on 
the perceived well-being of the aged. Typically households with many children are 
deemed to be among the poorest if one does not adjust for economies of scale. Then 
pensioner households or households headed by widows, etc are not very highly 
represented among the poor.
15 To illustrate the importance of equivalence scales, 
                                                 
14  Traditionally equal sharing is assumed, with possibly a downward adjustment for children. Yet there is 
ample evidence to suggest that this is not the case. In the real world, we observe a wide range of situations 
ranging from the idyllic image of a family all devoted to the care of its elderly members to the more 
depressing representation of elderly being kept in the closet. The later situation has recently received a lot 
of attention in India where widows who represent a large fraction of the elderly (55% of women aged 60 
and above are widowed—see Jensen 2003) and often do not receive an equal share within the household 
(Dreze and Srinavasan 1997). There is also the case of the Tanzanian “witches” studied by Miguel (2003) 
who shows how harshly unproductive members of a family can be treated by the others. 
 
15   Economies of scale resulting from living together and sharing goods such as housing, means of 
transportation, etc vary across countries, years and income levels. The extent of scale economies depend on 
the allocation between private and public goods in the household’s consumption basket, an allocation 
which is endogenous depending on prices and income. Household size, age and gender of household 
members may also influence the amount of resources needed to attain a certain level of well-being. The 
consumption needs of children are usually thought as being quite lower than that of adults. To go from 
household’s resources to individual well-being, the concept of equivalent household scale is used.  For 
example, the OECD currently uses an equivalence scale equal to 0.5 + 0.5 * (number of adults) + 0.3 * 
(number of children). A household consisting of two adults and three children would need to spend 2.4 
times as much as a single adult to be equally as well off as a single adult. By contrast, in the absence of 
economies of scale and with the same needs for both children and adults, this family would need 5 time as 
much as a single adult to reach the same welfare. An alternative equivalence scale formula is simply to take 
the square root of the family size (which, in our example, would give an equivalent size of 2.2, i.e., close to 
that of the OECD). Lanjouw, Milanovic and Paternostro (1998) examine the incidence of scale economies 
on the poverty rate of the elderly in selected transition economies. They show that, without scale 
economies, poverty in old age is relatively low but that it increases with scale economies and rapidly 
become more important than in younger age groups. 11 
 
consider a society in which the elderly on average belong to family units of size 2 
whereas the size of households without elderly is 5. Their aggregate income is 
respectively 5 and 10. Without scale economies, the elderly income is 2.5 and that of 
individuals living in households without elderly is 2.  Using a standard equivalence scale 
(i.e., the square root of family size), these figures become 3.5 and 4.4.  In other words, 
thanks to the economies of scale, the welfare of the non-elderly families can be higher 
than that of families with elderly.  
In that respect it is interesting to analyze the structure of our elderly households. 
As it appears in Table A2 in the appendix, Argentina is the country where there are the 
largest fraction (0.46) of elderly households in which elderly individuals live on their 
own. In most OECD countries this fraction is even higher. At the other extreme we have 
Nicaragua with only 10% of elderly households consisting of only elderly individuals. In 
many countries children (16-) live in elderly households. In Figure 2 we distinguish 
elderly households with and without non-elderly for poverty based on half the median 
income (These two subsets are denoted EHH2 and EHH1 respectively). It appears that 
poverty is relatively higher in the first group in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and in El 
Salvador. In all the other countries, poverty is higher in households made of only elderly 
individuals.  
In a number of cases the differences are huge showing the (assumed) role of 
family solidarity and the importance of the selected equivalence scale. To explore this 
point, as a thought experiment, we posit that all the elderly individuals would live on 
their own. More precisely, we assume that the elderly living with younger family 
members would split and live separately on their own resources. The outcome of such a 12 
 
split is given in Figure 3. Here again we see that Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay behave 
differently from the rest. In these countries poverty is lower for elderly living on their 
own than for younger individuals.  
In this exercise we have used the pivotal age of 60 to define old age. What 
constitutes “old age” needs to be defined in relationship to longevity. Mortality has been 
rapidly declining over the last 50 years but there are great variations across countries and 
over time. All things being equal, average income and poverty levels for individuals 
above 60 are clearly different if life expectancy is 78, as in developed countries, or 46 as 
in African countries. If the same cut-off age is chosen for all countries (say 60 or 65), 
there is a serious selection bias in the group of people above 60 in countries where 
longevity is 46.  However the comparison between rich and poor countries may be 
seriously flawed because the main reason why life expectancy at birth is low in poor 
countries is child mortality. 
Another difficulty comes from the relation between the pivotal age and the 
retirement age (i.e., the mandatory age at which workers have to stop working and/or the 
age at which retirees start benefiting from a pension). The rate of labor participation, 
formal or informal, above 60 varies significantly across countries and this depends in 
larger part on existing social security schemes.  This is the reason why the appendix 
reports results for the alternative cut-off age of 65. Table A3 compares the poverty rates 
for elderly 60+ versus elderly 65+. In most countries poverty is slightly higher with 65+ 






















Argentina  0.21 0.33  0.13  0.55 
Bolivia  0.23 0.31  0.29  0.52 
Brazil  0.22 0.33  0.06  0.52 
Chile  0.16 0.23  0.15  0.39 
Colombia  0.24 0.29  0.31  0.47 
Costa Rica  0.18 0.22  0.32  0.48 
Domin Rep  0.18 0.27  0.22  0.41 
Ecuador  0.19 0.25  0.25  0.39 
El Salvador  0.17 0.29  0.17  0.43 
Guatemala  0.22 0.3  0.24  0.35 
Honduras  0.28 0.39  0.31  0.52 
Mexico  0.19 0.24  0.28  0.43 
Nicaragua  0.2 0.25  0.17  0.29 
Panama  0.23 0.34  0.23  0.51 
Paraguay  0.23 0.3  0.23  0.41 
Peru  0.21 0.24  0.23  0.3 
Uruguay  0.17 0.33  0.08  0.51 
Venezuela  0.18 0.24  0.21  0.38 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank) 
OECD adjusted HH sizes are used to calculate the poverty headcount ratios. The poverty line is ½ of the 
national median per capita income in the surveys. 
 
 
Poverty Rates without Transfers 
Table 2 compares poverty rates (headcount ratios based on a ½ median income 
poverty line) in those 18 Latin American countries for the elderly.  The first columns 
show the poverty rates under the actual situation and the second set of columns the 
poverty rates without transfers. Computations are shown for both the elderly and the 
whole population. 
The incidence of social transfers appears clearly particularly when the post 
transfer poverty rate is low: Argentina's poverty rate falls from around 55 to 13 percent. 14 
 
Brazil’s rate falls from 52 to 6 percent and Uruguay’s rate from 51 to 8 percent. In 
general, however, the reduction in poverty rates is less important than in OECD countries 
for an obvious reason: with rare exceptions there are no pension systems in Latin 
American particularly aimed at reducing poverty among poor old people. 
 
Simulating the Impact of Minimum Pensions 
We now present the results of a micro-simulation exercise which consists in 
introducing a minimum pension in 18 Latin American countries. We follow Atkinson et 
al. (2002) and we are concerned with two questions: how much minimum pension 
schemes would cost and how much poverty would they would permit eradicating. The 
answer to both questions clearly depends on the particular design of the minimum 
pension scheme.  We present two possible schemes given a target minimum income of z. 
Let y denote the non public pension income of elderly and p their current public pensions 
plus social transfers. In other words private pensions, if any, are part of y. Furthermore, 
we take z as equal to the poverty line. 
1)  Unconditional topping-up:  Elderly transfer guaranteeing poverty line income to all 
individuals aged x or more:     T = Max (0. z-p)     if Age > x.   
2)  Conditional topping-up:  Elderly means-tested transfer guaranteeing poverty line 
income         T =  Max (0. z-p-y)    if Age > x.   
The first scheme thus implies a uniform minimum pension and the second a variable one, 
which depends on households’ resources.  
We briefly discuss the importance of the key parameters of these schemes. 15 
 
Age.  For contributory pensions, the eligibility age is part of the financial constraint 
conceived individually or collectively. But in the case of non-contributory pensions there 
is some arbitrariness in determining at what age a person with no resource and no 
employment history is entitled to a transfer.  The eligibility age should be determined by 
the capacity of the pensioner to work or not. It should thus be a function of her/his health 
and longevity. Given the level of benefits, the length of the entitlement—i.e., the 
difference between life expectancy and the age chosen—is what matters for the revenue 
constraint.  Traditionally the retirement age tends to be lower for women than for men 
even though lately one witnesses harmonization (always towards the higher age) driven 
by gender equality and budget constraint considerations. We report simulation results for 
two old age definitions: 60 and older (in the text) and 65 and older (in the appendix).  
Means Test. Since the objective is to reduce poverty in old age, the only meaningful 
choice is between an unconditional minimum pension and a conditional (i.e., means-
tested) pension. A minimum pension guarantee which covers only workers with some 
minimal career would exclude too many people. An unconditional pension has a number 
of advantages: it is administratively simpler; it implies less disincentives to work and 
save; and it carries less stigma. It is however costlier though there is the possibility of 
taxing those who do not really need it but this then creates some undesirable 
administrative costs: testing means or taxing those who do not need the pension are 
procedures that are formally similar. Therefore, a priori, an unconditional pension would 
cost more than a conditional one but would be more attractive. The choice boils down to 
questions of financial feasibility and, above all, political support.  If there are strong 
revenue constraints, it might be desirable to introduce other types of conditionality. For 16 
 
example, in Mexico, the uniform pension is offered in the Federal District to those known 
to be the poorest. In Brazil, the uniform pension (which is means tested) was initially 
restricted to rural areas. 
Level of Benefits.  It is reasonable to set the level of benefits as a function of an indicator 
of poverty such as the minimum wage or the poverty line. The benefit could be in cash or 
in nature. When there is a risk that the pension would not reach the elderly and when the 
pension is likely to be very small, it might be preferable to provide benefits such as food 
or health stamps than cash. In the microsimulations we take the poverty threshold as a 
benefit target. 
Fiscal Cost.  To approximate the cost of providing a minimum rate pension. we use the 
revenue constraint 
tEY = ET 
where t is the contribution rate;  Y is the individual income; and T is the level of 
minimum pension. We use the operator E as a short for the sum over all the individuals 
concerned. The feasibility of our minimum pension scheme will clearly depend on the 
level of t, that is the fraction of mean income that is needed to finance it.. 
 
Incentive Effects of Minimum Pensions 
Minimum pensions are expected to have disincentive effects on individual decisions and 
on the economic and social behavior of households—in particular, how pensions are 
shared within the family unit and their incidence on the labor supply of the members of 
the family—and policy design needs to take these into account.. In our microsimulations, 17 
 
these incentive effects are not taken into account,
16 but we discuss here the various 
behavioral reactions one can expect from minimum pensions schemes. 
Retirement Decision. In developed countries. low rates of activity among elderly workers 
and low effective age of retirement threaten the financial viability of social security 
systems by generating, in conjunction with increasing longevity, high dependency ratios 
(Dethier 2009; Gruber and Wise 1999).  The availability of a minimum pension at an 
early age is a factor explaining early retirement. For developing countries, a low rate of 
labor participation in old age is less of an issue.  The problem can be avoided by choosing 
an entitlement age that is not too low.  Comparing means-tested and unconditional 
minimum pension schemes, the former one will induce retirement earlier than the latter to 
the extent that it includes an earnings test. 
Prodigality Effect. In the presence of a minimum pension. some individuals who would 
otherwise have saved for retirement could be tempted to reach retirement without any 
resources trusting that they are entitled to some minimal protection. These individuals, 
labeled “rational prodigals” in the economic literature, have to be induced to save by 
making the minimum pension less attractive. However, by doing so in a world of 
asymmetric information, one penalizes people who really depend on the minimum 
pension because they are unable to accumulate enough resources for retirement. The 
prodigality argument was introduced by Hayek (1960, p. 286) who advocated an old age 
pension whose raison d’être “is not that people should be coerced to do what is in their 
individual interest but that by neglecting to make provisions, they would become a charge 
                                                 
16  To do so we would require behavioral microsimulations which are outside the scope of this paper. 18 
 
to the public. Up to this point the justification for the whole apparatus of ‘social security’ 
can probably be accepted by the most consistent defenders of liberty.” 
17  
Mobility. The incidence of a minimum pension when workers are mobile is ambiguous. 
From the tax competition literature, we know that it will attract low income retirees from 
less generous neighboring countries. This will have the effect of pushing down these 
pensions and of resulting in what is often called a “race to the bottom.” At the same time 
the insurance of obtaining a minimum pension regardless of one’s career can induce 
mobility within a country. 
Longevity.  Dependency ratios are lower in developing countries because longevity is 
lower—which limits the fiscal cost of a minimum pension—but the trend in developing 
countries is toward an increase in dependency ratios as a result of increased longevity and 
declining fertility (Wolfensohn and Bourguignon 2004, p.26). The cost of minimum 
pension programs will thus increase. At the same time minimum pensions would, by 
themselves, induce an increase in longevity since they would provide the elderly with 
better food and health care. Even in societies where minimum pensions and other 
transfers are “confiscated” by other members of the extended family, there are incentives 
to keep the beneficiaries alive and well as long as possible. 
Weakening Family Ties. In developing countries, elderly people often live in an extended 
family and, in the absence of pensions, rely on younger generations to provide them food 
and care. These types of arrangements have been studied by sociologists, anthropologists 
and more recently by economists (Barrientos, Gorman and Heslop 2003).  The 
                                                 
17 Along the same lines, it is worth pointing out that a minimum pension can affect financial risk taking. In 
countries with individualized accounts and retirement funds invested in the stock market, middle and low 
income workers may have a strong incentive to choose a portfolio with high risk and high return profiles as 
they can always be bailed out . 19 
 
mechanisms underlying these family arrangements range from pure altruism to 
cooperative or strategic exchange, to social pressure.  One hypothesis—known as the old 
age security hypothesis—linking social security with fertility and family solidarity goes 
as follows: in the absence of social security. parents depend on their children to give them 
care and attention in their old age and, thus, tend to have many children.  As societies 
develop, social security institutions appear, and children are much less needed as sources 
of support in old age: fertility falls and family links distend (Bourguignon 2005). 
Since we are interested to find out what impact a minimum pension would have on 
poverty in old age, the relevant question is how the additional resource represented by 
this transfer would be used by the elderly living in an extended household.  The key issue 
is whether or not they will benefit, at least in part, from their pension. Some family 
structures in Africa and in Asia care for the elderly but restrict their needs to the 
minimum (see for instance Drèze and Srinavasan 1997 and Miguel 2003). In such 
situations. a minimum pension would de facto be confiscated away from the elderly and 
miss its intended objective.  
Spillover Effects.  In general one expects a more equitable allocation of resources within 
the extended family to result from transfers of this type with positive welfare 
consequences arising from minimum pensions. The case of South Africa is interesting in 
this regard. Women turning 60 and men turning 65 become eligible for a pension roughly 
equal to twice the per capita income of Black Africans in South Africa. The cash transfer 
had a double effect.  First. it resulted in a drop in labor supply of prime-age individuals 
living with these elderly, particularly when the pensioner is a woman (Bertrand, 
Mullainathan and Miller 2003). Second it resulted in improved health of the 20 
 
granddaughters when the grandmother is the beneficiary (Duflo 2003). These results 
show the type of ‘arbitrage’ that can be observed in an extended family. The role played 
by women is also striking. These minimum pensions have positive spillovers for other 
members of the extended family. Carvalho Filho (2008) has studied the effect on labor 
outcomes and school enrollment of children residing with the beneficiaries of the 
pensions awarded to rural workers in Brazil. These old age benefits foster school 
enrollment and decrease child labor participation, and the intensity of these effects 
depends on the gender of the beneficiaries and of the children concerned.  
 
Simulation Results for 18 Latin American Countries 
We now turn to the results of our “mechanical” (as opposed to behavioral) 
microsimulations using household survey data for 18 Latin America countries for the 
latest available year. The surveys give us the disposable income (resources) and the 
family structure for aged people. We use two alternatives definitions of old age: 60 and 
65 (Results for the latter are reported in the appendix). The disposable income is the sum 
of all the resources available in the family unit to which the elderly person(s) belong(s) 
divided by the equivalence scale. The simulation consists in introducing a minimum 
pension equal to the poverty rate. This pension is given to all elderly provided they do not 
receive any other transfers from the government. If they do, the new pension is adjusted 
accordingly. We consider two scheme depending on whether or not the minimum pension 
is means tested, the means being the resources of the elderly concerned. 
We use two specifications for the minimum pension  US$2.5 a day or 50% of the 
median income. We are interested in measuring the impact on the poverty rate and the 21 
 
fiscal cost of this minimum pension. Since the minimum pension is aimed at reaching the 
poverty line, if all elderly lived by themselves, poverty in old age would disappear. 
Poverty would thus only remain because a majority of elderly live with younger family 
members with whom they share all the available resources. Consequently, results will 
depend on the equivalence scale and on the structure of the family where the elderly 
people live.  
The results are presented in figures 5 and 6 for the two levels of poverty. These 
figures show the decrease in poverty rates due to the two types of schemes. Not 
surprisingly the decline in poverty is higher when there is no means test. In that case, 
some elderly end up with an income higher than the poverty line and this can be shared 
among all the members of the households. Let us repeat that if all elderly were living on 
their own, poverty would disappear under the two schemes,  
Cost of the Minimum Pension Schemes 
It might be useful to relate the cost of our  minimum pension scheme to the 
concept of poverty gap, that is the amount relative to the poverty line that has to be 
transferred to the poor families to bring their incomes up to the poverty threshold. In 
other words the poverty gap give the relative amount of resources that one needs to 
eradicate poverty. If we measure the poverty gap for the population of elderly and if we 
assume that all the elderly live alone, the poverty gap and the cost of a minimum pension 
with means testing would coincide.
18 
                                                 
18 Table A3 in the Appendix presents the poverty gap index for the whole population and for the population 
of elderly. The poverty gap index is the ratio of the difference between the poverty level and the actual non 
pension income of the poor  over  the poverty line. The  relative cost of the means  test scheme is the ratio 
of the difference between  the poverty line and  the  actual non pension income  over the average income. 
 22 
 
Figures 5a and b show the cost of the minimum pension expressed as a fraction of 
personal income.
19 The cost is high when the poverty line (and thus the minimum 
pension) is based on 50% of median income—which is the minimum pension scheme 
that is the most efficient at lowering poverty. The highest cost is for Ecuador and Mexico. 
It is naturally higher when there is no means test.  The cost depends on the share of old 
persons in the total population; on the average income of old households relative to the 
median; and on the presence or not of transfers (the minimum pension policy will be 
more expensive if there are no transfers to start with). 
Tables 3a and b summarize some of the key results.  With half the median income 
the relative reduction ranges from 17% in Colombia to 75% in Costa Rica.  The absolute 
reduction ranges from 2% in Brazil to 24% in Costa Rica. As to the relative cost, it 
ranges from 0.1% to 2.9% in Colombia. Colombia is a particular case. The minimum 
pension there costs a lot and yet it has a very small effect, both relative (0.168) and 
absolute (0.05). This puzzling result is due to the family structure: remember that if all 
elderly lived by themselves, old age poverty would be eradicated under this scheme. 
Poverty remains because the minimum pension is diluted among non-elderly household 
members. 
Under the $2.5-a-day scheme, the absolute reduction in poverty ranges from a 
negligible amount in Chile and Uruguay to 11% in Colombia. The relative reduction 
ranges from 16% in Nicaragua to 80% in Argentina. Not surprisingly the cost is lower. It 
is negligible in Brazil and Chile and reaches a maximum of 1.5% in Colombia. 
                                                 
19 To express it as a GDP share, the figures would need to be multiplied by a factor of 0.5 to 0.7. 23 
 
Final Comments   
Poverty in old age is still prevalent in a large number of Latin American 
countries. Universal minimum pensions would be an effective and administratively 
simple way to substantially reduce poverty among the elder generation.  The cost of such 
a scheme is far from negligible but it is reasonable. Both the effect and the cost of such a 
scheme drastically vary with the type of poverty threshold chosen. Relative to half the 
median income a US$2.5-a-day pension costs less. This is particularly true in richer 
countries since the half the median income approach is relative and a $2.5 a day pension 
seems negligible in those countries. 
The affordability of minimum pension schemes depends on the poverty threshold 
that is chosen ($2.5 a day or half the median income) and on the country’s average 
income level. As a rule of thumb, we would say that countries with national income 
above the Latin American average could and should opt for a minimum pension equal to 
half the median income. For other countries, a $2.5 a day pension appears reasonable. It 
is interesting to consider the countries that are relatively richer than the other: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico and Venezuela. It is clear that a minimum pension equal 
to half the median income seems to be more desirable in the latter two countries where 
poverty is higher and its reduction substantial (12% in both countries) under this 
definition of the poverty threshold. If we turn to the poorest countries—Bolivia, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay—a $2.5 minimum pension will have noticeable 
effects and a cost ranging from 1.1% to 0.3%, which seems affordable. It is worth 
noticing that Bolivia (in which a quasi universal pension scheme exists) continues to have 
quite a high poverty rate among elderly. This naturally comes from the fact that the 24 
 
existing scheme provides benefits that are quite below the poverty line based on $2.5 a 
day. 
How politically sustainable are such schemes? Even if such pension scheme is 
adopted there is always the risk to see it progressively eroded because of lack of political 
will. Elderly people particularly in developing countries do not have much political 
weight. Relative to OECD countries, their demographic importance is small. To the 
extent that the majority of elderly live with their children, they cannot express their 
concerns truly independently. For these reasons it is important to give the minimum 
pension scheme a constitutional status within a framework that takes into account 
socioeconomic parameters that change over time. For example, the age at which the 
pension is made available could vary with longevity, which generally improves over time 
as mortality rates decline in developing economies. Benefits should not be absolute but 
be linked to national income growth. As national income grows, a US$2.5-a-day pension 
quickly loses its attractiveness. 
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Table 3a.  Summary Results: Poverty reduction among the elderly with means-tested 
minimum pensions 




























Argentina  0.13 0.09  0.685  0.019  0.012 
Bolivia  0.29 0.17  0.597  0.012  0.007 
Brazil  0.06 0.01  0.198  0.001 0 
Chile  0.15 0.05  0.369  0.006  0.005 
Colombia  0.31 0.15 0.48  0.029  0.02 
Costa Rica  0.32 0.24  0.738  0.021  0.016 
Domin Rep  0.22 0.13  0.621  0.019  0.014 
Ecuador  0.25 0.1  0.402  0.009  0.007 
El Salvador  0.17 0.11  0.656  0.024  0.018 
Guatemala  0.24 0.08  0.347  0.007  0.005 
Honduras  0.31 0.16  0.508  0.017  0.013 
Mexico  0.28 0.12  0.405  0.009  0.007 
Nicaragua  0.17 0.02  0.133  0.005  0.003 
Panama  0.23 0.15  0.643  0.018  0.013 
Paraguay  0.23 0.14  0.591  0.019  0.014 
Peru  0.23 0.15  0.633  0.022  0.016 
Uruguay  0.08 0.05  0.709  0.017  0.011 
Venezuela  0.21 0.12  0.581  0.023  0.016 
 Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEDLAS and The World Bank) 
OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty headcount ratios.  
 26 
 
Table 3b. Summary Results: Poverty reduction among the elderly with means-tested 
minimum pensions 





























Argentina  0.03 0.02  0.796  0.006  0.004 
Bolivia  0.17 0.09  0.523  0.006  0.003 
Brazil  0.01 0.01  0.526 0  0 
Chile  0 0  0.348  0  0 
Colombia  0.22 0.11  0.504  0.015  0.011 
Costa Rica  0.07 0.05 0.72  0.004  0.003 
Domin Rep  0.02 0.01  0.514  0.005  0.004 
Ecuador  0.13 0.06  0.423  0.003  0.003 
El Salvador  0.1 0.07  0.658  0.017  0.013 
Guatemala  0.08 0.03  0.365  0.002  0.002 
Honduras  0.21 0.11  0.5  0.011  0.008 
Mexico  0.15 0.08  0.536  0.003  0.003 
Nicaragua  0.12 0.02 0.16  0.003  0.002 
Panama  0.06 0.05  0.722  0.005  0.003 
Paraguay  0.1 0.07  0.661  0.01  0.008 
Peru  0.12 0.08  0.648  0.011  0.008 
Uruguay  0 0  0.679  0.003  0.002 
Venezuela  0.1 0.05  0.51  0.011  0.008 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank) 
OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty headcount OECD adjusted HH sizes are used 















































































































































































































Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income
Household incomes were equivalized using the OECD Equivalency Scale Adjusted household size [= 1+(# of adults-1)*0.5 + (# of children*0.3)]
An adult was a household member aged 18 years or more, & a child was a household member aged less than 18 years at the time of the survey
Elderly are household members aged 60 years or more
Households with >=1 elderly member are divided into 2 subsets: EHH1 (elderly living alone by themselves) & EHH2 (consisting of both elderly
and non-elderly members)
Figure 1a. Poverty headcount ratio
All individuals



















































































































































































































Poverty line = $2.5 a day
Household incomes were equivalized using the OECD Equivalency Scale Adjusted household size [= 1+(# of adults-1)*0.5 + (# of children*0.3)]
An adult was a household member aged 18 years or more, & a child was a household member aged less than 18 years at the time of the survey
Elderly are household members aged 60 years or more
Households with >=1 elderly member are divided into 2 subsets: EHH1 (elderly living alone by themselves) & EHH2 (consisting of both elderly
and non-elderly members)
Figure 1b. Poverty headcount ratio
All individuals























































































































































































































































Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income, OECD equivalency scale adjusted household size
Poverty headcount ratios for the population & its subgroups estimated using the same poverty line
Elderly are household members aged 60 years or more
Figure 2. Poverty headcount ratio
Elderly from EHH1 & EHH2
Elderly from EHH2











































































































































































Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income, OECD equivalency scale adjusted household size
The poverty line in both cases is the same as that in the original population  without the artificial splits
Elderly living alone vs. elderly in artificially split households
Figure 3a. Poverty headcount ratio
Elderly in EHH1













































































































































































Poverty line = $2.5 a day, OECD equivalency scale adjusted household size
The poverty line in both cases is the same as that in the original population  without the artificial splits
Elderly living alone vs. elderly in artificially split households
Figure 3b. Poverty headcount ratio
Elderly in EHH1















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income, OECD equivalency scale adjusted household size
The poverty profiles after top-up transfers were estimated using the pre-transfer poverty line
After top-up transfer (with change in poverty headcount ratio)
Figure 4a. Poverty headcount ratio
Headcount among 60+ (no means test) Change in headcount (no means test)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poverty line = $2.5 a day, OECD equivalency scale adjusted household size
After top-up transfer (with change in poverty headcount ratio)
Figure 4b. Poverty headcount ratio
Headcount among 60+ (no means test) Change in headcount (no means test)
























































































































































































































Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income
Cost is expressed as top-up pensions summed across HH's as a %age of incomes summed across all HH's in the country
Elderly are household members aged >=60 years




















































































































































































































Poverty line = $2.5 a day
Cost is expressed as top-up pensions summed across HH's as a %age of incomes summed across all HH's in the country
Elderly are household members aged >=60 years
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Argentina  2006 10,815  333  222  75  0.21 
Bolivia  2007 3,758  225  124  66  0.23 
Brazil  2006 8,505  326  180  72  0.22 
Chile  2006 12,173  450  263  78  0.16 
Colombia  2004 7,231  161  88  72  0.24 
Costa Rica  2006 9,004  329  209  79  0.18 
Domin Rep  2006 6,242  269  160  72  0.18 
Ecuador  2006 6,737  255  149  75  0.19 
El Salvador  2006 5,687  24  17  71  0.17 
Guatemala  2006 4,064  200  119  70  0.22 
Honduras  2007 3,298  165  91  70  0.28 
Mexico  2002 12,563  262  163  74  0.19 
Nicaragua  2005 2,311  151  92  72  0.20 
Panama  2006 9,186  294  169  75  0.23 
Paraguay  2005 3,900  253  148  71  0.23 
Peru  2006 6,323  215  140  73  0.21 
Uruguay  2007 9,683  386  260  76  0.17 
Venezuela  2006 9,924  232  167  73  0.18 
 
*Source: World Bank, International Comparison Program database. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product 
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in 
the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any   41
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current international dollars. 
 
†Average and median monthly per capita incomes were reported in SEDLAC in Local Currency Units (LCU’s). These were converted to 2005 LCU’s using 
annual CPI data for each country from IMF’s International Financial Statistics Tables. Finally, these were converted to 2005 international dollars using PPP’s 
from the World Bank’s International Comparison Program database. As some of the countries in the sample experienced annual inflation rates exceeding 10%, 
conversions using monthly (rather than annual) data would have yielded more accurate estimates of per capita incomes than those reported above. However, 
since survey dates were not available for two-thirds of the countries in our sample, we were only able to report the estimates using yearly data. 
The correlation between the per capita GDP and average per capita income reported from the surveys is 0.66, and that between the per capita GDP and median 
per capita income is 0.70. 
 
‡Source: World Bank staff estimates from various sources including census reports, the United Nations Population Division's World Population Prospects, 
national statistical offices, household surveys conducted by national agencies, and Macro International. Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a 
newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
 
§Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and The World Bank). OECD 
adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty headcount ratios. The poverty line is ½ of the national median per capita income.  42
























Argentina  3.4 0.32  0.46 
Bolivia  4.05 0.24  0.31 
Brazil  3.18 0.23  0.32 
Chile  3.65 0.39  0.3 
Colombia  4.04 0.3  0.17 
Costa Rica  3.74 0.25  0.31 
Domin Rep  3.74 0.27  0.21 
Ecuador  4.22 0.33  0.29 
El Salvador  4.18 0.31  0.21 
Guatemala  5.02 0.25  0.19 
Honduras  4.62 0.27  0.15 
Mexico  4.2 0.25  0.27 
Nicaragua  5.32 0.28  0.1 
Panama  3.79 0.3  0.29 
Paraguay  4.3 0.29  0.24 
Peru  4.5 0.32  0.24 
Uruguay  2.91 0.41  0.54 
Venezuela  4.3 0.26  0.17 
 Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEDLAS and The World Bank) 
Elderly are HH members aged >=60 years. Column 1 reports the mean number of HH members in all 
households. Column 2 reports the fraction (# of HH’s with at least one elderly member HH) / (total  # of 
HH’s in the country) i.e. #EHH/#AHH. Column 3 reports the fraction (# of HH’s with elderly living by 
themselves)  / (# of HH’s with at least one elderly member) i.e. #EHH1/#EHH. 
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Table A3.  Poverty Headcount Ratios  



























Argentina  0.21 0.24 0.13 0.11 0.12 
Bolivia  0.23 0.24 0.29 0.19 0.26 
Brazil  0.22 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Chile  0.16 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.15 
Colombia  0.24 0.24 0.31 0.29 0.33 
Costa Rica  0.18 0.2 0.32  0.25  0.36 
Domin Rep  0.18 0.2 0.22  0.17  0.22 
Ecuador  0.19 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.27 
El Salvador  0.17 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.19 
Guatemala  0.22 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.26 
Honduras  0.28 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.32 
Mexico  0.19 0.21 0.28 0.25  0.3 
Nicaragua  0.2  0.22 0.17 0.15 0.17 
Panama  0.23 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.24 
Paraguay  0.23 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.26 
Peru  0.21 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.25 
Uruguay  0.17 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.07 
Venezuela  0.18 0.2 0.21  0.18  0.23 
 Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEDLAS and The World Bank) 
For estimates using the OECD adjusted HH size as well as those using unadjusted HH sizes, the poverty 
line is ½ of the national median per capita OECD adjusted income in the surveys.      44








Argentina  0.09 0.06 
Bolivia  0.1 0.12 
Brazil  0.09 0.02 
Chile  0.05 0.04 
Colombia  0.14 0.21 
Costa Rica  0.07 0.15 
Domin Rep  0.06 0.07 
Ecuador  0.07 0.12 
El Salvador  0.06 0.06 
Guatemala  0.08 0.09 
Honduras  0.15 0.16 
Mexico  0.08 0.15 
Nicaragua  0.07 0.05 
Panama  0.11 0.11 
Paraguay  0.09 0.09 
Peru  0.08 0.1 
Uruguay  0.05 0.02 
Venezuela  0.08 0.11 
 Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEDLAS and The World Bank) 
OECD adjusted HH sizes with a poverty line of ½ of the national median per capita OECD adjusted income 
in the surveys. Elderly are HH members aged >=60 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 